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It is our second time hearing this case on appeal.
Elizabeth Harvey originally brought a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Officer Ronald Dombroski and other
defendants for the allegedly unconstitutional search of her
apartment in the context of her ex-boyfriend‟s repossession of
property. Officer Dombroski was at the scene of the
repossession serving to maintain the peace, and there was a
question as to whether he took an active role in the
repossession or remained neutral. The District Court initially
ruled in favor of all the defendants on summary judgment,
and we reversed with respect to Officer Dombroski in holding
that there was a material factual dispute as to whether
Dombroski acted under color of state law. Harvey v. Plains
Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Harvey I”).
On remand, the District Court conducted a jury trial and, at
the conclusion of the two-day trial, provided a verdict form
that limited the state action issue to a single factual question:
whether Dombroski ordered Harvey‟s door to be opened.
The jury found in the negative, and Harvey lost.
We find that the verdict form was in error. Action
under color of state law must be addressed after considering
the totality of the circumstances and cannot be limited to a
single factual question. For the foregoing reasons, we will
vacate and remand this case to the District Court for a new
trial.
I.
At one point, Elizabeth Harvey and Edward Olowiany
jointly leased an apartment from Joan Chukinas, their
landlord. The relationship between Harvey and Olowiany
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ended, and Harvey received a protection from abuse order
(“PFA”), which granted her exclusive possession of the
apartment and ordered Olowiany to retrieve all of his
belongings immediately after entry of the PFA. Olowiany did
just that, but later that month, Olowiany‟s lawyer mailed
Harvey a letter seeking permission to return to retrieve
additional items. Harvey ignored the letter. Two weeks later,
a second letter was sent. Harvey claims that she was away
from her apartment and did not receive the second letter. In
the meantime, Olowiany attempted to repossess the additional
property and sought police presence to maintain the peace.
Officer Dombroski was dispatched by the Plains
Township Police Department and arrived at Harvey‟s
apartment at 2:00 p.m. on a weekday. Olowiany and his
friend Tina George arrived five minutes later, as did Chukinas
with a key to the apartment. Harvey was not home. They
waited for thirty minutes, at which point they began
discussing ways to obtain access to Harvey‟s apartment.
Dombroski testified that Chukinas asked him whether it
would be permissible to open Harvey‟s door:
I said to her, based on what I had known from
my supervisor and the letters I had seen [from
Olowiany‟s lawyer] . . . I can‟t see a problem
with it, everyone got the letter and that was it. I
never told her to open the door. . . . I told Joan
[Chukinas] I could not see a problem with it
because I believed everybody got the letter.
(App. at 243.) Chukinas testified that “the policeman okayed
me to open the door” (id. at 41-42) and that she “would have
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never opened the door if I didn‟t have permission from the
policeman.” (Id. at 35-36.) After Chukinas opened Harvey‟s
door, Dombroski and Olowiany entered the apartment.
Olowiany left with several items, and Harvey arrived later
that day to find her apartment “in shambles.” (Id. at 123-24.)
Harvey originally brought this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Officer Dombroski, Police Chief Edward
Walsh, the Plains Township Police Department, the Plains
Township Board, and Joan Chukinas for the unconstitutional
search of her apartment. The District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor
of all the defendants. On appeal, we reversed the District
Court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer
Dombroski and remanded the case. Harvey I, 421 F.3d at
187.
The District Court held a jury trial. At the conclusion
of the trial, the Court instructed the jurors as to Harvey‟s
§ 1983 claim. It instructed that action under color of state law
means “that the plaintiff must show that the defendant was
using power that he possessed by virtue of state law.” (App.
at 302.) The Court went on to note that, “in order to
determine if the . . . plaintiff established her Section 1983
claim, you must answer only one factual question, and that is
did the defendant order the landlady to open the door to the
apartment.” (Id.) The District Court also provided a verdict
form with the first question reading as follows:
1) Did Defendant Ronald Dombroski act under
color of state law with regard to the repossession of personal property at Plaintiff
5

Elizabeth Harvey‟s apartment on September 18,
1999? Only answer “Yes” if you find that
Defendant Ronald Dombroski ordered the
landlord to open the door of the apartment.
____ Yes

____ No

If you answered “No” please sign and date the
verdict form and return to the courtroom. If you
answered “Yes” proceed to question 2.
(Id. at 315.) Harvey failed to raise objections to the jury
instructions or verdict form, and the jury answered “No” to
the first question. Harvey now appeals with the assistance of
amicus curiae for whom we thank for its service.1
II.
Because Harvey failed to raise an objection to the jury
instructions or verdict form, we conduct plain error analysis.
Under Rule 51, we “may consider a plain error in the
instructions that has not been preserved . . . if the error affects
substantial rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2). We must
therefore consider whether the District Court committed an
error and, if it did, whether the error affected Harvey‟s
substantial rights.

1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1343. We have jurisdiction over Harvey‟s
timely appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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A.
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, Harvey had to show,
first, that she was deprived of a constitutional right and,
second, that the alleged deprivation was “committed by a
person acting under color of state law.” Harvey I, 421 F.3d at
189 (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). The
first element was not in dispute. The case turned on whether
Harvey could prove that Dombroski acted “under color of
state law.”2 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Action under color of state law “requires that one
liable under § 1983 have exercised power possessed by virtue
of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law.” Abbott v. Latshaw,
164 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). We have considered state action in the
context of private repossessions before. The test is whether
the officer maintains neutrality or takes an active role in the
repossession resulting in an unconstitutional deprivation. Id.
at 147. “The mere presence of police at the scene of a private
repossession does not, alone, constitute state action.” Id. An
2

The terms “under color of state law” and “state
action” are used interchangeably. Where deprivations of
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are alleged against
state officials, these two requirements converge. Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982); Abbott v.
Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1998) (“If . . . conduct
satisfies the state action requirement of the Due Process
Clause, then it also qualifies as action „under color of state
law‟ for § 1983 purposes.”).
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officer‟s presence may be requested to maintain the peace,
and the officer appropriately does so by remaining neutral.
An officer abandons neutrality once he takes an active role
and assists in the repossession.
The relevant inquiry, then, is whether an officer
affirmatively aided a repossession such that he can be said to
have caused the constitutional deprivation. Such aid may
take the form of facilitation, encouragement, direction,
compulsion, or other affirmative assistance in the
repossession.3 See Marcus v. McCollum, 394 F.3d 813, 819
(10th Cir. 2004). However, liability will only attach when an
3

Relevant circumstances may include whether the

officer:
[1] accompanied the private party onto the scene,
[2] told the debtor that the seizure was legal,
[3] ordered the debtor to stop interfering or he would
go to jail,
[4] intervened at more than one step in the
repossession process,
[5] failed to depart before the repossession has been
completed,
[6] stood in close proximity to the creditor, [or]
[7] unreasonably recognized the documentation of one
party over the other[.]
Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1117 (10th Cir.
2008) (citing Marcus v. McCollum, 394 F.3d 813, 819 (10th
Cir. 2004)).
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officer plays a “principal role” in the seizure. Abbott, 164
F.3d at 147. In short, an officer may be liable for causing a
constitutional deprivation if he “aid[s] the repossessor in such
a way that the repossession would not have occurred but for
[his] assistance.” Marcus, 394 F.3d at 819.
The distinction between maintaining neutrality and
taking an active role is not to be answered in the abstract.
There is no precise formula, and the distinction lies in the
particular facts and circumstances of the case. See Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (“Only
by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the
nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be
attributed its true significance.”). To determine whether a
police officer acted under the color of state law, the facts and
circumstances of the police officer‟s role in the private
repossession must be examined in their totality.
See
Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1983).
At one point, the District Court in our case instructed
the jury correctly:
The crucial inquiry is whether the police officer
was, one, present simply to stand in case there
was a breach of the peace or whether the police
officer was, two, taking an active role and
affirmatively assisted in the repossession.
(App. at 308.) But, as noted, the Court also incorrectly stated
that “in order to determine if the . . . plaintiff established her
Section 1983 claim, you must answer only one factual
question, and that is did the defendant order the landlady to
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open the door to the apartment.” (Id. at 302.) Importantly,
the verdict form explicitly limited the factual inquiry to a
single question: whether “Dombroski ordered the landlord to
open the door of the apartment.” (Id. at 315.)
We find that the jury instructions and verdict form
were in error. They precluded a full investigation of the facts
and circumstances. Whether there was action under color of
state law is dependent upon the role played by Dombroski in
the repossession. The state action question must be addressed
after considering the totality of the circumstances and cannot
be limited to a single factual question.
Applying the totality of the circumstances test, a
reasonable jury could have found that Dombroski intervened
and aided Olowiany so as to cause the constitutional
violation. Dombroski went to the scene of the repossession at
Olowiany‟s behest, implied the search was legal by telling the
landlord it was all right to open the door, entered the
apartment to observe Olowiany remove items, stayed until
repossession was complete, followed immediately behind
Olowiany during the seizure, unreasonably recognized
Olowiany‟s documentation – a letter prepared by Olowiany‟s
attorney purporting to list all the items which belonged to
Olowiany – even though Harvey was not present to contest
the information in the letter, and attempted to mark off the
items as Olowiany took them. The verdict form prevented the
jury from considering these relevant facts and circumstances.
Dombroski offers three replies. First, he argues that
the presence of the plaintiff at the scene of the repossession is
a “crucial” factor in finding state action. Because Harvey was
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not present at the scene of the allegedly unconstitutional
search, argues Dombroski, we cannot find state action. We
rejected this argument in Harvey I, where we did “not read
[case law] as embracing a rule that requires the plaintiff‟s
presence in order to find state action.” 421 F.3d at 191. For
the same reason we reject Dombroski‟s first argument.
Second, Dombroski argues that the verdict form
conformed with the facts of the case and the theory of liability
advanced by Harvey. He cites numerous statements by
Harvey‟s counsel in opening and closing statements that
Dombroski “ordered” the landlord to open the door. “At no
time,” argues Dombroski, “did Harvey contend or argue that
Chukinas opened the door to the apartment because she was
coerced, intimidated, or otherwise[] caused to open the door
against her will.” (Dombroski Br. at 13.) We find to the
contrary. In his closing argument, Harvey‟s counsel stated:
We have a police officer who as an authority
figure, just as a mother or father is an authority
figure. And if the mother or father says to the
child, it‟s okay to open the door . . . the person
is going to respond because that is basically an
acceptance by the authority figure to go ahead
and do it. This is implied if anything else, you
go ahead and open the door. He had no
authority to allow her to open the door. That
was not in his permissive area as a police
officer. That amounted to police action on his
part.
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(App. at 289.) Even if Harvey‟s primary argument was that
Dombroski ordered Chukinas to open the door, her counsel
also argued and introduced evidence showing that
Dombroski‟s intervention caused Chukinas to open the door.
Harvey was entitled to the correct verdict form and jury
instructions. See Hilord Chem. Corp. v. Ricoh Elecs., Inc.,
875 F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1989).
Third, Dombroski argues that the instructions and
verdict form were in conformity with our opinion in Harvey I.
In a footnote, we stated,
It is a much different question whether state
action could be found if Chukinas asked
Dombroski if she could open the door and he
assented (such that there was no official order to
open the door). The cases above suggest that
Dombroski‟s mere assent to opening the door,
provided that the choice to open the door
remained with Chukinas, would not qualify as
state action.
Harvey I, 421 F.3d at 191 n.6. The mere fact that Dombroski
approved Chukinas‟s opening the door is insufficient to
establish state action. Indeed, mere approval is not state
action as long as “the choice to open the door remained with
Chukinas.” Id. However, the verdict form prevented the jury
from reaching a determination of whether the choice to open
the door in fact remained with Chukinas. Considering the
totality of the circumstances, the jury may have determined
that Dombroski played an active role in the repossession.
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B.
An error constitutes plain error if: “(1) [the error is]
fundamental and highly prejudicial or if the instructions are
such that the jury is without adequate guidance on a
fundamental question and (2) our failure to consider the error
would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Alexander v. Riga,
208 F.3d 419, 426-27 (3d Cir. 2000). A jury instruction,
taken as a whole, must inform the jury of the correct legal
standard. Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n,
949 F.2d 1241, 1259 n.15 (3d Cir. 1991). When a jury
instruction is erroneous, a new trial is warranted unless such
error is harmless. See Advanced Med., Inc. v. Arden Med.
Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 188, 199 (3d Cir. 1992). An error is
harmless if it is “highly probable” that the error did not
contribute to the judgment. Id. An erroneous jury instruction
may also be considered non-fundamental when, taking the
instructions as a whole, the erroneous instruction is a “solitary
misstatement of law” buried in an otherwise correct legal
explanation. Ryder v. Westinghouse Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 137
(3d Cir. 1997).
The jury instructions and the verdict form contained
fundamental, highly prejudicial errors that went beyond
minor misstatements of the law. While the instructions
included part of the correct legal standard for state action in
the context of a repossession, the Court stated that if the jury
found that “Dombroski did not direct or order[] the landlady
to open the door,” then he did not act under the color of state
law and the jury must return a verdict for the defendant.
(App. 308-09.) This error was reinforced by the verdict form,
which forced the outcome of the case to be determined by a
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single finding of fact: whether Dombroski ordered the
landlord to open the door. In Hurley v. Atlantic City Police
Department, we held that the District Court failed to instruct
the jury that punitive damages against the upper management
of a company could only be awarded if upper management
was involved in the violation. 174 F.3d 95, 122-24 (3d Cir.
1999). We reversed the finding of punitive damages because
the jury instructions “failed to provide proper guidance for the
jury on a fundamental question.” Id. at 124; see also
Beardshall v. Minuteman Press Int’l, 664 F.2d 23, 26 (3d Cir.
1981) (holding that the District Court‟s failure to instruct the
jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error).
The District Court in this case did not merely omit an
instruction but instructed the jury incorrectly. As a result, the
jury conducted an improper finding of fact and reached an
unsound conclusion. The jury was unable to exercise its factfinding function to fully consider the facts and circumstances.
If the Court had provided a proper verdict form, the jury may
have reached a different result. The jury may have found that
Dombroski played an active role in the repossession, even if
he did not order the landlord to open Harvey‟s door. The
District Court‟s error was, therefore, fundamental because it
affected the central element in dispute, and it was prejudicial
because the jury may have reached a different result.
Second, the failure to consider the District Court‟s
error would result in a miscarriage of justice. The central
issue in dispute at the trial was the role played by Officer
Dombroski, and Harvey may have lost entirely because of the
Court‟s erroneous verdict form.
Though this is a
discretionary power that we should exercise sparingly, we
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believe that finding plain error is appropriate in this case. See
Hurley, 174 F.3d at 124 (stating that failure to consider a
jury-instruction error omitting an element of a claim “would
result in a miscarriage of justice”); Choy v. Bouchelle, 436
F.2d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 1970) (holding that failure to consider
an improper jury instruction would constitute a miscarriage of
justice).
IV.
Because we will vacate the order of the District Court,
we need not address the additional claims raised by Harvey in
her brief. For the aforementioned reasons, we will vacate and
remand this case to the District Court for a new trial.
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